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“Am I a woman in these
matters?”1
Notes on Sinhala nationalism and
gender in Sri Lanka
Jeanne Marecek
When one speaks…of a nation…as a homogenous political entity,… [one
assumes that] people homogeneously inhabit any given piece of territory.
(Luxemburg 1976:135)

Sri Lanka, known as Ceylon until 1972, is a small island in the Indian Ocean, 40
miles off the southeast coast of India. It is a country in which four of the world’s
major religions (Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam and Christianity) are represented and
in which three languages (Sinhala, Tamil and English) are recognized as official
languages. Sri Lankans identify themselves as members of one or another so-called
“ethnic” groups—Sinhala, Tamil, Muslim and Burgher being the most prominent.
The uneasy and sometimes violent relations among these groups are referred to by
locals as “ethnic tensions”; indeed, even the fifteen-year civil war fought by Tamil
separatists against the Sinhala-dominated state is usually referred to as the “ethnic
conflict.”
It is ethnic groups within Sri Lanka and the relations and tensions among them
that are the focus of present-day discourses of national identity in Sri Lanka.
Although I use the terms “ethnic group” and “ethnic conflict” in deference to local
custom, “ethnic” in this case is actually a convenient misnomer, as these groupings
are not uniformly constituted by ethnicity. Sri Lanka’s Muslims for instance, trace
their ethnic origins to a number of different regions of the world, while “Muslim”
identity is based on religious affiliation. Nor are the categories of “ethnic” identity
as stable, bounded or internally homogenous as the term “ethnic group” might imply.
Among Tamils in Sri Lanka, for instance, place of residence and migration history
serve as significant markers of difference.2 Among Sinhala-identified people, religion
(Buddhist or Christian) has demarcated an acrimonious divide at various times in
the past. Indeed, within every ethnic group, cross-cutting factors such as language,
religion, caste, region and urban versus rural residence make for multiple
identifications.
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Recounting the violent intergroup conflicts of the recent past, Valentine Daniel
points out that in Sri Lanka, “race, religion, and language have formed an unholy
alliance that is charged by its claimants, adherents, and speakers, respectively, with
the mission of dividing the nation’s citizens” (1996:17). Scholars of history,
anthropology, linguistics, sociology and Pali and Buddhist studies have brought
considerable intellectual energy to assessing the linguistic, religious and racialized
claims of popular nationalisms in Sri Lanka, amassing evidence to support or rebut
those claims. In the main, this scholarship has regarded such issues as the Aryan
ancestry of the Sinhala people, the territorial boundaries of traditional homelands
and various claims of preferential treatment as questions of fact. Setting the factual
record straight, scholars believed, could settle competing claims and presumably quell
nationalist passions. Attention to the discursive constitution of claims and purported
facts is relatively recent. Attention to the play of gender in nationalist discourse too
is relatively recent.
This chapter concerns Sinhala nationalism and those Sri Lankans who identify
themselves as Sinhala people, a group that accounts for 74 percent of Sri Lanka’s
population and that dominates the political and cultural life of the island. It looks
beyond Daniel’s “unholy alliance” of race, religion and language to gender as another
constituent of identity. More specifically, I ask about the representations of women
produced in the discourses and practices associated with Sinhala nationalism. First,
I consider the narratives of Sinhala identity that emerged in the anti-colonial
movements that began at the turn of the century. Then I shift to the present to ask
how persisting residues of those narratives sometimes constrain and sometimes
enable certain activities and identities of women in contemporary Sri Lanka. The
chapter focuses exclusively on women and images of womanhood. It remains for
future researchers to probe representations of manhood and masculinity, as well as
homoeroticism and homosociality, in Sri Lankan discourses of national identity.3
Moreover, my focus does not include Tamil peoples (who account for 18 percent)
and Muslim peoples (7 percent), peoples who struggle for political representation,
justice and safety within the Sinhala-dominated state.4 I hope that even if it does not
answer fully the questions that it raises, this chapter will spur further inquiry into
the constructions of identity of all ethnic groups in Sri Lanka, and the ideologies of
gender and sexuality embedded within them.
Partha Chatterjee’s (1990, 1994) analysis of nationalism in India offers a framework
for opening inquiry into gender and nationalism in Sri Lanka. The cultural and political
histories of Sri Lanka and India (especially its southern portions) overlap considerably,
and so we should expect correspondences between Indian and Ceylonese
nationalisms as they took shape in the early part of the twentieth century. Sri Lanka
was an integral part of a polity comprising a number of kingdoms of the South Indian
region from the fourth century B.C. onward. Moreover, Sri Lanka and India shared
a history of British colonial rule; the British administered both territories with policies
and regulations that were inflected with English ideas about men and women, sexual
morality and family relations.
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Speaking about India, Chatterjee identified the central problematic in the quest
for sovereign nationhood as follows: how to modernize the nation along Western
lines while simultaneously establishing an essential local identity as the basis for
political claims to nationhood. In Chatterjee’s analysis, gender operates as a key
element of the symbolic code for organizing the social world in such a way that
these dual goals both can be achieved and the contradictions between them
minimized or concealed. Gender is one of a linked set of binary oppositions:
outer/inner, material/spiritual, modern/traditional, men/women, public/private
and West/East. When the social world is bifurcated along gender lines, the
activities demanded by modernization become part of the domain of men, while
practices that create and sustain a national identity that is continuous with the
past are assigned to women.
In Ceylon, as in India, “one of the predominant nationalist responses and
resistance to British colonialism…took the form of a gendered separation of
spheres: a feminized ‘private’ and a masculinized ‘public’” (de Alwis 1995–96:17).
Different roles, different spaces and different orientations to past and future were
associated with men and women. In the masculine public sphere, the demands
and possibilities of modernization could be given free play. It was in the feminine
private sphere of domestic life that cultural traditions were to be revived and
preserved. Representations of ideal womanhood sustained a specific Sinhala
identity anchored in the ancient past. As we shall see later, this ideal woman was
modest, chaste and ignorant of the world beyond home. Positioned in the
confines of the home, she was obedient to her husband and devoted to the needs
of her children and other family members. These roles and traits were inscribed
both as aspects of “Eastern” women’s essential nature and as matters of patriotic
duty. Nationalist ideologies about gender difference, gender relations and a
separate feminine sphere were devised primarily by and for members of the
urbanized middle class. As such, they defined the aspirations, obligations and
moral character of middle-class “gentlewomen”; in contrast, women from the
urban lower classes were deemed coarse, unclean and sexually immoral (cf.
Mohanty 1991). The next section turns to Ceylonese anti-colonial movements
in the early decades of the twentieth century; it traces ideologies of gender and
family relations embedded in assertions of Sinhala identity at that time. Ironically,
the efforts to construct a local identity different from and superior to that of
the foreign rulers remained heavily invested with the political values, moralities,
and gender ideologies of those rulers.
Anti-colonialism and the construction of Sinhala identity
In Ceylon, resistance to colonial rule and demands for self-determination
mounted in earnest at the end of the nineteenth century and continued until
independence was granted in 1948. The national liberation movements
coalesced around the Sinhala people, who were the majority of the
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population, and around Buddhism, the religion associated with the Sinhala
majority. Thus, this wave of Ceylonese nationalism was Sinhala and Buddhist;
its “Others” were the British, Christians (both local and foreign) and the
West. Yet even when the anti-colonial movements were violently antiWestern, the ideologies they proffered reproduced the Western project of
progress, liberalism and humanism in many ways. Indeed, the very project
of constructing a sovereign Ceylonese state was grounded in Western models
and ideals. In Ceylon, as in India, organized resistance to colonial rule was
not in opposition to the culture of the rulers, but contained within it (cf.
Spivak 1985). This should not be surprising: many of those who spoke out
against colonial rule in Ceylon were English-speaking elites; they had been
exposed to Western ideas in their education and some had been schooled
in the West.
By the beginning of the twentieth century, Ceylon had experienced 400
years of European colonization; colonization began with the Portuguese in
1505, who were followed by the Dutch (1640–1796) and the British (1796–
1948) in unbroken succession. The prolonged colonial occupation had
created changes in all aspects of social and economic life, including gender
arrangements. The successive waves of colonizers had imposed changes in
marriage, gender relations and sexual practices, bringing them more into line
with Western norms. European missionaries brought religions that demanded
monogamy, forbade sexual unions and childbirth outside of marriage, and
insisted that marriage was lifelong. Practices in each of those areas had been
more relaxed prior to colonization (Yalman 1967); moreover, Christianization
transformed sexual behavior into a moral issue. Furthermore, under British
r ule, sexual behavior and family life came under state regulation. For
instance, the colonial administration required registration of marriages and
births, declared infanticide a crime, outlawed bigamy, limited the grounds
for divorce and required it to be regulated by the courts (Risseeuw 1988,
1996).
The regulation of marital and sexual practices facilitated the transition
to an economy based on private ownership and individual initiative. As Carla
Risseeuw (1992) details, it also had the effect of transfor ming gender
relations in ways inimical to women’s interests. Defining marriage as a
lifelong monogamous union concentrated land ownership and economic
power in the male members of a family. Moreover, such unions made women
more dependent on their husbands and diminished their connection to their
families of origin. More generally, Western ideals of womanhood and family
were imposed upon local conceptions of marriage, divorce, adoption,
offspring, rights of widows, women’s work and sexual morality. Ironically,
it was these conceptions, practices and values—not pre-colonial ones—that
figured in the anti-colonialists’ ideologies of righteous Sinhala womanhood
and their vision of an indigenous and specifically Sinhala civilization.
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Dharmapala and Sinhala Buddhist nationalism
Anagarika Dharmapala (1864–1933) was a central figure in the national liberation
movement and in the Buddhist revival that took place in the early decades of
the twentieth century. Dharmapala is still revered among Sinhala people as a
national hero and a folk historian. Ethnic and religious chauvinism, as well as
gross inaccuracies, are palpable in Dharmapala’s fabrications of the ancient past.
Yet, his writings are frequently reprinted in major newspapers, especially on
Buddhist religious holidays. They are offered—and consumed—as accurate
accounts of Sinhala history.
Dhar mapala’s thought embodied both a quest for modern sovereign
nationhood, conceived along Western lines, and the claim of an essential local
identity on which demands for sovereignty could be based. In a turn against his
family background and education, Dharmapala had become adamantly opposed
to Western culture, which he characterized as “barbaric.” Despite his repudiation
of Western cultural values, he nonetheless favored Western science, technology
and industrial development. At the same time, Dharmapala preached the
separateness and difference of the East from the West, and the Ceylonese (for
him, co-terminus with Sinhalese) from Europeans. He proclaimed the Sinhala
people to be descendants of the “Aryan race” and the people chosen to be the
defenders and preservers of Buddhism. Several volatile ideas weave through his
writings: the revival of a glorious and righteous ancient Aryan civilization, the
racial superiority of the Sinhala people, the deep connection between the
Buddhist faith and Sinhala ethnicity, and the island of Ceylon as the chosen
province of Buddhism. All these ideas remain prominent today. Buddhism is a
potent political force as well as a key social institution drawing large-scale financial
support and other resources from the state. Although freedom to practice any
religion is guaranteed in the constitution, Buddhism remains the “first among
equals” (Bartholomeusz 1995). Although not all Sinhalese are Buddhists, the
notion of a special relationship of Buddhism to the Sinhala people and to the
island of Sri Lanka remains a rallying cry for Sinhala nationalist movements
(Obeyesekere 1992). Moreover, substantial numbers of Buddhist clergy, from
prominent religious leaders to ordinary monks, are vehement proponents of
Sinhala hegemony; some clergy members support militarization and even violence
to achieve that end (Tambiah 1992).
It is Dharmapala’s views on women and gender relations that are of interest
to us here. Dharmapala unhesitatingly accepted the support and patronage of
wealthy European women, among them feminists, suffragists and political
activists. Nonetheless, he insisted that Sinhala women repudiate European ways
and feminist values. He admonished Sinhala women to “return” to the purported
ideals of Aryan womanhood: they should be chaste and modest, subordinate their
needs to those of the members of their households, and submit obediently to
their husbands. According to Dharmapala, only by embracing such ideals could
women earn respect and find true liberation (Jayawardena 1986).
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Dhar mapala endeavored to make women the guardians and visible
representatives of Sinhala culture, assigning them the task of enacting cultural
superiority and separateness. He urged a number of reforms on Sinhala women
that would serve to set them apart from women of other faiths and ethnic
backgrounds. According to Dharmapala, a Sinhala woman should not allow
herself to become Europeanized; she should not wear European clothing, smoke
or drink. He urged Sinhala women to don the sari, a garment that he believed
signified modesty and tradition. (Ironically, the sari was not traditional Sinhala
dress, but an import from South India.) Dressing in sari was not only a practice
of modesty and tradition, but also marked a woman as Sinhala by her outward
appearance. Tamil women, Muslim women and European women all dressed
differently.5 Thus, for Dharmapala, women’s dress and demeanor would serve
to demarcate the boundaries of Sinhala identity. Moreover, by practicing a
superior form of femininity, Sinhala women would embody and ensure the
cultural ascendancy of the Sinhala “race.”
Dharmapala’s nationalism imposed strictures on women that constrained their
behavior, freedom of movement and self-determination. Not all efforts to
inculcate a distinctive and separate Sinhala identity had constraining effects on
women, however. The nationalist project of promoting Buddhist education had
emancipatory potential for women. By the end of the nineteenth century,
opposition to foreign rule prompted a rejection of Christian missionary education
and a drive for Buddhist education. This drive was propelled by a number of
intertwined forces: the anti-colonialists’ desire to undermine the dominance of
Christianity; a reaction against the British rulers’ preferential treatment of
Christians in employment; and the impact of the worldwide Buddhist revival.
As part of this drive, wealthy families funded the establishment of Buddhist
schools in several provincial towns as well as in the capital city of Colombo
(Jayawardena 1995a).
The drive for Buddhist education involved educating girls as well as boys and
thus it occasioned a shift in educational practice that had a dramatic effect on
women. Prior to that drive, Sinhala families had resisted education for their
daughters, a fact remarked on by foreign observers throughout during the 1800s
(Harris 1994). Rates of literacy among women were extremely low. As late as
1881, the census had estimated that only 2.5 percent of all women in the country
could read, compared to 30–40 percent of men; rates of literacy for Sinhala
women in particular were even lower. By 1911, however, literacy rates for women
increased to 10.6 percent. An even more dramatic improvement was registered
among Sinhala women, whose rates of literacy increased from 1.4 percent to 9.1
percent (Denham 1912). This embrace of girls’ education has continued unabated;
Sri Lanka presently claims the highest female literacy rates (88 percent in a 1986
assessment) in the South Asian region (Jayaweera 1995a).
The drive for Buddhist education was first and foremost a reaction against
c o l o n i a l r u l e. Ye t t h e i n i t i at ive t o g ive g i r l s a B u d d h i s t e d u c at i o n
encompassed a diverse array of motives and interests. For some educators,
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a Buddhist education was a means of emancipating women, a project crucial to
the political and social advancement of the nation. For others, the goal of
educating girls was to produce Buddhist wives who would cultivate the Buddhist
faith in their homes and secure their husbands’ faith against pressures to convert
to Christianity. For others, providing girls with a Buddhist education was part
of the project of constructing a Sinhala national identity. Educated to understand
and appreciate their own cultural and religious heritage, women would carry that
heritage forward to future generations. Yet even when schooling was designed
to train girls only for domestic roles, it equipped them for activities in the public
sphere as well. And no matter what goals educators held for girls, schooling
served to widen female students’ horizons.
The legacies of Sinhala Buddhist womanhood
Ceylon was granted independence in 1948. In the fifty years leading to
independence, anti-colonial nationalism had become thoroughly enmeshed with
Sinhala chauvinism. Following Independence, the identification of the state of
Ceylon with the Sinhala majority had a poisonous influence on communal
relations. The Sinhala-dominated government instituted policies and practices
that favored Sinhala and Buddhist interests, exacerbating differences and divisions
among ethnic groups. The passage of the Sinhala Only Act in 1956 marked a
watershed in the new nation’s history. This piece of legislation made Sinhala the
single official language, thus marginalizing Tamil speakers and English speakers
(whatever their ethnic group membership—Sinhala, Tamil, Muslim or Eurasian)
economically, culturally and politically. The politics of language, which persisted
throughout the 1950s, created a milieu in which English-educated people were
assigned “the cultural role of national scapegoat” (Gooneratne 1992:16). Many
English speakers—even those who were bilingual—were sufficiently discouraged
by the situation and fearful of the future that they elected to emigrate. Moreover,
tensions between ethnic groups escalated too, flaring on occasion into outbursts
of serious violence.
The anti-Tamil riots of 1983, the worst in the island’s history, marked another
watershed in post-Independence history. The violence lasted for several days,
destroying lives, businesses and homes. The Sinhala-dominated government
delayed in taking measures adequate to stem the violence; moreover, many believe
that some state officials and police actively abetted the Sinhala mobs. In the
aftermath of the 1983 violence, some Tamil people fled the country and others
sought safety in the northern and eastern parts of the island, areas in which Tamil
people predominated. Furthermore, what had been sporadic guerrilla activity by
groups of Tamil militants in the jungles of the north and east consolidated into
a full-scale war waged by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (hereinafter
L.T.T.E.) against the state. As the war has persisted, the L.T.T.E.’s demands
for greater representation and more political autonomy have transformed
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into a secessionist call for Tamil Elam, that is, a sovereign Tamil state carved
out of the northern and eastern territory of the island.
The civil war in Sri Lanka has produced a crisis of unprecedented
proportions. As the war continued into its fifteenth year, the public, in
Neloufer de Mel’s words, “have adopted ferocious communal positions”
(1996:168). Claims about the distinctiveness and cultural superiority of
Sinhala people, as well as their natural right to political supremacy and to
ownership of the island, are asserted by various groups, including such
extremist groups as the Front for the Protection of the Sinhalese, the J.V.P.
(Janatka, Vimukthi Peramuna or People’s Liberation Front) and the Jathika
Chinthanaya (more or less, Nationalist Way of Thinking) movement. Indeed,
there are presently some 56 Sinhala and Buddhist organizations united under
an umbrella org anization called the Sinhala Commission. Among its
activities, the Sinhala Commission has issued public reports detailing
injustices suffered by Sinhala people, staged public hearings and organized
large-scale protest demonstrations. It has been working to prevent a
negotiated settlement of the civil war, seeking instead a military victory. The
Sinhala Commission also has registered strong opposition to proposed
constitutional reforms that would transform Sri Lanka into a federation of
states wherein predominantly Tamil regions would gain a modicum of
autonomy and protection from Sinhala majoritarianism. Whereas earlier
forms of Sinhala nationalism were primarily anti-colonial and anti-British,
today it is asserted vis-à-vis local Others, primarily Tamils.
Assertions that the Sinhala people constitute a “race” distinct from other
groups on the island and from peoples of “the West” continue to be made
not just by ideologues b ut also by officials at the highest levels of
government. Claims of historical continuity with “Aryan civilization” are
often asserted as well. Women remain central figures in contemporary
discourses of Sinhala nationalism. As Kumari Jayawardena and Malathi de
Alwis have put it:
While the basis for identity has shifted within each country [in South Asia],
each ethnic group still has its myths of origin (Aryan, Dravidian, Semitic)
and its Golden Age in which women were “free.” They were situated within
a “glorious” mythical past in which social divisions were absent…. In such
a context, minorities were represented as invaders, outsiders, or aliens who
cor r upted the pristine purity of the majority. T hey were accused of
destroying ancient traditions and the old idyllic way of life and disrupting
the political hegemony of a “united” polity; most of all, they represented
the threat of rape and thereby the possible “pollution” of the “daughters
of the soil.”…As property of the national collective, the woman-mother
symbolises the sacred, inviolable borders of the nation.
(Jayawardena and de Alwis 1996: x)
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In the remainder of this chapter, I focus on three groups of contemporary
women who have stepped outside the entailments of Sinhala womanhood:
women elected to political office; housemaids and garment workers (forms of
wage work newly available to women); and women engaged in feminist activism
and women’s mobilization. Women in each category are in some ways refusing
the ideology of authentic Sinhala/Sri Lankan womanhood, and thus have aroused
more than their share of animosity and anxiety. The projects that these women
are engaged in have little in common with one another. Yet, as we shall see, the
attacks on them in popular discourse and mass media reiterate similar themes,
themes that hark back to those promulgated by Dharmapala and other early
nationalists.

Women in politics
Whenever norms of propriety exclude women from the public sphere and
demand modesty and submission, political leadership by women remains fraught
with contradiction. Yet Sri Lanka—like India, Pakistan and Bangladesh—has a
strong record of female leadership at the highest level of government. In the
fifty years since Independence, two women have been elected to the office of
Prime Minister in Sri Lanka: Srimavo Dias Bandaranaike (elected in 1960) and
her daughter, Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga (elected in 1995). Presently,
Mrs. Bandaranaike holds the office of Prime Minister and Mrs. Kumaratunga,
the office of Executive President. At lower levels of government, however, the
record of female leadership remains bleak; indeed, women rarely even contest
elections. Moreover, virtually all women who have held high political office in
Sri Lanka since Independence—whether President, Prime Minister, Member of
Parliament or head of a political party—have come from elite families with strong
political backgrounds, often extending over many generations (de Silva 1995).
Most such women first entered politics by stepping into a void created by the
death (often by assassination) of a close male relative.
This pattern of women’s political participation might suggest that women can
safely enter the political arena if they come from an elite background or if they
cast themselves as fulfilling the unfinished mission of a dead father or husband.
However, Malathi de Alwis’s (1995) reading of the careers of recent female
political figures in Sri Lanka suggests that flouting the norms of womanly conduct
is not so easy. Respectability is indeed an essential attribute for a woman in public
life, but respectability, at least as far as women are concerned, is also highly
unstable, as de Alwis points out.
The early years of Chandrika Kumaratunga’s presidency offer a paradigmatic
case of this instability. Mrs. Kumaratunga comes from an old aristocratic Sinhala
family, one that has a distinguished tradition of political leadership. Her father
was assassinated while ser ving as Prime Minister and her husband was
assassinated while standing for election; in her campaign and afterward, she
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frequently alluded to their deaths and to their ideals and visions for the country.
Mrs. Kumaratunga also holds an array of educational credentials earned abroad.
On grounds of class, caste and family connections, her respectability is beyond
reproach. Furthermore, Mrs. Kumaratunga’s campaign platform seemed
constructed to embrace many traditional virtues of Sinhala womanhood. She
pledged to bring peace and unity to the country. She promised to end the civil
war through political negotiation rather than military domination and conquest.
She vowed to uncover and rectify the human rights abuses of the previous
administration, to bring perpetrators to justice, and to recompense victims. She
also vowed to “clean house” by abolishing the corruption identified with the
past administration. In her campaign speeches, she invoked eloquent and
emotion-laden images of herself as a mother and as a woman who had lost loved
ones to violence, thus stressing her common cause with ordinary women.
Mrs. Kumaratunga’s first years in office illustrate how entering public life can
undo a woman’s claim to respectability, no matter how carefully constructed and
seemingly impeccable that claim is. Despite her aristocratic heritage and her use
of the symbols of motherhood, widowhood and filial respect for her deceased
father and her mother, Mrs. Kumaratunga’s respectability came under siege as
soon as she stepped into the public sphere. Neither her aristocratic background
nor her effort to portray herself as a maternal figure insulated her from moralistic
attacks by both mainstream newspapers and the tabloid press. Simply being in
public life and fulfilling the ordinary social obligations of a head of state was
recast as immoral conduct by the mainstream press. Drinking wine at formal state
dinners, eating meals in five-star hotels, staying out “too late” and traveling
without her mother’s permission were described as improprieties in Mrs.
Kumaratunga’s personal conduct. Tabloids and gossip columns circulated
inflammatory rumors about inebriation, alcoholism, love affairs and even casual
sexual liaisons with men of lower standing. In short, those opposed to Mrs.
Kumaratunga sought to undercut her political leadership not by criticizing her
politics but by impugning her sexual morality and womanly virtue. Such attacks
reverberated in the popular imagination, undermining Mrs. Kumaratunga’s stature
as a political leader.
Mrs. Hema Premadasa, whose husband served as President from 1989 until
his assassination in 1993, shared a similar onslaught of public degradation once
she entered the public arena, as Malathi de Alwis (1995) carefully documented.
As the President’s wife, Mrs. Premadasa labored assiduously in a series of widely
publicized social service projects, “village upliftment” schemes, and charitable
giveaways. These projects can be seen as attempts by Mrs. Premadasa to position
herself as “a nurturing and beneficent ‘Mother of the nation’” (de Alwis
1995:146). Her efforts, however, were undercut by a continual stream of sexual
jokes and rumors of sexual improprieties in the tabloids and gossip networks.
Mrs. Premadasa’s claims to respectability were further undercut by pointed
allusions to her lower-class background, such as remarks about her “gaudy”
saris and “vulgar” deportment (de Alwis 1995). Yet when Mrs. Premadasa
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dressed in styles associated with the upper-class Sinhala aristocracy, she was
ridiculed for presuming to reach above her caste/class background, behavior
regarded as distasteful and even morally offensive. One middle-class man,
superintendent of a tea plantation, summarized to me what he regarded as Mrs.
Premadasa’s penchant for self-aggrandizement as follows: “What to do? These
are the things that happen when nobodies try to be somebodies.” Mrs. Premadasa
was left sexualized, morally degraded and with her dubious class and caste origins
exposed to public scrutiny.
By stepping into the public arena, Mrs. Kumaratunga and Mrs. Premadasa each
defied long-standing ideals of Sinhala womanhood; Mrs. Premadasa and her
husband further challenged the hegemony of the class- and caste-based
aristocracy. The vicious character assassinations directed at them demonstrate
the Catch-22 that women in political office face: respectability is a prerequisite
for a woman to enter the public sphere, yet a woman cannot retain her
respectability once she is there. Malathi de Alwis astutely interprets this Catch22 in terms of the link between male dominance and nationalism: “the patriarchal
g aze of the nation…constantly seeks to scrutinize the under-belly of
respectability” (de Alwis 1995:150). The relentless mudslinging that Mrs.
Kumaratunga and Mrs. Premadasa faced served not only to discredit them but
also to deter other women who might seek political office. Character
assassinations that focus on women’s sexual behavior and sexual morality not
only impugn women themselves but also discredit the honor of their families
of origin and their offspring. It is not surprising that women, though well
represented in the civil service, have avoided running for elected office. Only a
minute proportion (less than 4 percent) of candidates for elected offices at all
levels of government (national, provincial and local) have been women (de Silva
1995).

Working women and wage labor
Economic necessity has long demanded that poor women in Sri Lanka contribute
to the economic support of their families. Until recently, however, the wage work
available to women consisted mainly of small-scale cottage industries, seasonal
agricultural work and domestic service. Only among plantation laborers, a group
composed mostly of Hill Country Tamils, were large numbers of women
employed in an organized sector of the economy. In the late 1970s, however,
two new forms of wage work for women emerged; both were available to women
from all ethnic groups: domestic service in the Middle East and work in urban
g ar ment factories. Although both occupations involve low wag es, no
advancement and exploitative conditions, these jobs represent the best-paying
(if not the only) employment for lower-class women irrespective of ethnic group
identity. Many women have been recruited and many more desperately seek them
out. According to the statistics compiled by the Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign
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Employment, 710,000 Sri Lankans were working in the Middle East as of
1997. Most Middle East workers are female housemaids; most are married and
mothers. As of 1992, nearly 105,000 women were employed in garment factories
in the Export Processing Zones (E.P.Z.s); most were young and single (Jayaweera
1995b).
In itself, the visible presence of women in the paid workforce violates the
doctrine of separate spheres and female domesticity on which respectable Sinhala
womanhood is premised. For housemaids and garment workers, the conditions
of work further violate the norms of feminine sexual propriety, motherhood
and subordination to male authority in the family. Housemaids live in the
households of their foreign employers; most garment workers in the E.P.Z.s live
in dormitories maintained by the factories. Both groups of workers thus live apart
from their families; their behavior is not under the direct supervision of their
fathers or husbands. Moreover, they have a degree of financial autonomy that
is unusual. Housemaids in the Middle East further violate local norms by leaving
their children in the care of others, most often their female relatives. In these
ways, domestic service abroad and urban factory work place women workers
outside the imperatives of respectable Sinhala womanhood. In consequence,
these women have been targets of moralizing attacks.
The sexual morality of garment workers is a common target of popular
suspicion. Factory girls whose virtue has been compromised, whether by
seduction or coercion, are stock characters in tele-dramas (serialized television
shows) and Sinhala-language cinema. Sensational rumors circulate freely through
gossip networks about promiscuity, abortions (which are illegal in Sri Lanka),
rape, H.I.V. infection and prostitution among garment workers in the E.P.Z.s.
Indeed, the pejorative nickname for garment workers, “Juki girls” (after the brand
name of the industrial sewing machines used in the factories), connotes sexual
promiscuity (Lynch 1996).
In recent years, the number of rural women (as opposed to lower-class urban
women) seeking wage work has escalated in response to adverse economic
conditions. The entry of these women into the paid workforce has compounded
anxieties about workers’ sexual morality. It is in the rural countryside—a place
of such mythic significance that most Sinhalese simply refer to it as “The
Village”—that Sinhala culture is believed to persist in its original untainted form.
Women of “The Village” are figured as innocent and simple custodians of
modesty and virtue; they are hailed as continuing to embrace the tradition that
“woman, as wife and mother, has her own preordained place” (Jayawardena n.d.).
In a report of her fieldwork with garment workers, Caitrin Lynch (1996) quotes
one informant, a factory supervisor:
These young women are people who have grown up under the shade of their
parents, in the village, preserving Sinhala customs and traditions. [They] are
girls who consider ethics and culture as their lives.
(Lynch 1996:6–7)
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Young women from “The Village” come in for special scrutiny and criticism from
which urban women are exempted. For instance, garment workers are castigated
for purchasing jewelry, perfume, handbags and Western-style clothing, items that
signal a departure from feminine virtues of self-abnegation and modesty; young
women working in city office jobs are free to buy such items (Lynch 1996).
Indeed, a sexual double standard seems to operate with reference to middle-class
“city girls” and lower-class “village girls.” As one “village girl” said:
Actually office staff in Colombo [the capital city] must be misbehaving too. But
since they are dressed properly and they come in a vehicle and because of their
family background, they cover-up themselves.
(Lynch 1996:3)

So strong are anxieties about the sexual morality of “village girls” that one plank
in the campaign platform of President Ranasinghe Premadasa was the “200
Garment Factories Program,” an initiative to build factories throughout the
countryside expressly to keep women in the village and away from corrupting
urban centers (Lynch 1996).
Virtually all Sri Lankan women in domestic service abroad are married and
with children (Dias and Weerakoon 1995). This demographic pattern reflects the
dual feminine imperatives of sexual purity and pronatalism embedded in
discourses of national identity. The preoccupation with women’s premarital
chastity prevents women who are unmarried from seeking work that requires
them to live in the household of an unrelated male. Moreover, women are
expected to bear a child as soon after marriage as possible. Ignoring these
imperatives places women at risk of social censure. But paradoxically, housemaids,
who have conformed to them, still face charges of immorality. Though they are
married, they are still accused of sexual promiscuity. Furthermore, as mothers
who have entrusted their children to others’ care, they endure further
disapprobation.
In the spring of 1996, I interviewed three rural-based community health
workers about their work. Without prompting, the two male workers named
women’s employment in the Middle East as the single root cause of problems
they encountered: men’s alcoholism, gambling and marital infidelity; fathers’
neglect and sexual abuse of their children; children’s truancy, suicides and drug
addiction; separations, desertions and divorce; jealousies and conflicts among
extended family members; and soaring rates of suicide. Yet, a case-by-case
inventory of their current caseloads did not turn up a single situation that actually
involved a housemaid working in the Middle East. Moreover, when I asked if
they could recall any specific cases involving a mother working in the Middle
East, they could not. When I asked whether men might bear some responsibility
for their behavior, the third worker—a young woman—took over the floor. The
blaming tone continued but the content shifted to housemaids’ sexual morality.
Housemaids in the Middle East, she informed me, enjoyed such cosmopolitan
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lifestyles and lavish living standards that they could not readjust to village life
on their return. Moreover, she asserted, many housemaids working abroad
engaged in such morally objectionable practices as promiscuity, prostitution and
producing babies to sell to European couples.
When women take up wage work away from their families, their actions
challenge the gender dualisms and power relations on which the distinctiveness
and superiority of Sinhala (and, by extension, Sri Lankan and even Eastern)
identity has partly been predicated. Women who are wage workers and
breadwinners challenge traditional conceptions of both femininity and
masculinity, as well as traditional gender differentials in status and power in their
households and in the community. Moreover, with large numbers of rural women
desperate for jobs in the Middle East and in garment factories, the idealized
images of rural life are hard to sustain. For most housemaids, working abroad
is a last resort for the survival of their families; their husbands are unemployed,
have deserted the family or otherwise do not contribute money to the support
of their families (CENWOR 1987). Some go to the Middle East to escape from
alcoholic husbands or abusive marriages (Gamburd 1995). Rural villages are beset
by grinding poverty, rampant alcohol abuse among men, high levels of domestic
violence, marital dissolution and desertions, and rates of suicide that are the
highest in the world (Ratnayeke 1996). To confront the realities of village life is
to explode an idealization that props up collective Sinhala identity. “The Village”
is far from a haven of bucolic tranquillity and harmonious relations rooted in
timeless Sinhala culture.

Women’s activism
Women played a significant part in the anti-colonial resistance in Ceylon during
the early decades of the twentieth century, whether as feminists, suffragists or
participants in trade unions, political parties and peasant agitations. But
Dharmapala and many other nationalists of that era did not acknowledge
women’s activism and contribution to public life. Instead, the proper model of
righteous and respectable womanhood was the woman who served her family’s
needs, who practiced modesty and subservience, and who confined herself to
the home. In contemporary Sri Lanka, women’s activism still sits uneasily
alongside such definitions of righteous womanhood. The vocal presence of
women in public life, whatever causes they espouse, transgresses the ideal that
women belong in the domestic sphere.
Kumari Jayawardena (1995b: 404), a leading feminist scholar in Sri Lanka, has
traced reactions to feminist efforts to improve women’s status by contrasting
editorials published in Sri Lanka’s leading national newspaper to mark
International Women’s Day. In the English-language edition (whose readership
is limited to the Westernized, urban elite), the editors praised women’s
achievements, declared that “the much flogged male chauvinist pig is as dead as
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a dodo” and hoped that “women’s libbers” would continue their work to
“improve the status of women.” In contrast, the Sinhala-language edition (with
a readership that is more diverse economically, educationally and regionally)
carried a dramatically different message. Its editorial mounted a scathing attack
on feminists asserting that their “slogans and drumbeats” were borrowed from
the West. “Feminists,” it asserted, were financed by “foreign money” in order
“to promote sexual promiscuity and cultural degeneration.” Further editorial
commentary repeated the theme of feminism as a despised Western import:
The feminine consciousness as it obtains today is…ideological baggage borrowed
from the West.
Like most other fads to which our alienated elite genuflect, this too is a concept
hatched in a West riddled by…problems.
(Jayawardena n.d.: 2)
The fashionable women’s lib…is merely a chic posture devoid of any meaning
to the large bulk of Sri Lanka’s women.

The assertion that feminism is a faddish Western import alien to the true culture
of Sri Lanka conjures up memories of the immediate post-Independence period
(the 1950s) in Ceylon, when the linguistic nationalists turned against the so-called
“brown Sahibs,” the English-speaking, Westernized elite, driving many out of
the country. It positions feminists as a tiny group of alienated, degenerate elites,
setting them against “the large bulk of Sri Lanka’s women.” This latter group is
presumed to share a commitment to a uniform indigenous culture, to uphold
traditional sexual morality (as opposed to promiscuity) and to be content with
the status quo. One can guess that the dramatic difference in editorial content
between the English-language edition and the Sinhala-language edition reflects
the editors’ assessment of their readership’s stance on both gender equality and
questions of national identity. The scathing indictment of feminism as a “concept
hatched in the West” serves to promote the idea that the Sinhala-speaking
majority share a unitary, unique and superior identity. Imagery that portrays Sri
Lankan feminists as a deracinated and morally suspect elite exerts a powerful
constraining effect on many of them. Some activists have elected to position
themselves as public mothers and as guardians of the nation’s morality; they have
directed their energies toward such issues as childhood prostitution, sex tourism
and foreign pedophiles. Other activists are privately critical of this imagery, but
choose to craft their public stances to sidestep the charges that they are outsiders
to the “true” culture and purveyors of Western degeneracy. Thus, they have
made strategic choices not to bring certain issues into public debate, for fear
of backlash and a greater repression than already exists. Many of these issues
center on women’s sexual agency, for example, the preoccupation with female
premarital chastity; the use of g ynecological tests of virginity prior to
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marriage and the inspection of bed sheets after the wedding night; the ban
on legal abortion; the expectation that all women marry and bear children;
the silence around lesbian sexuality; and the sexual abuse of children and
servants by male members of the household. More generally, feminists have
steered away from challenging gender relations in the domestic sphere. For
instance, even with the rising number of women who work outside the home,
there has been no public call for men to shoulder a share of the burden of
housework and child care (Kiribamune 1993). Thus, the association of
wo m e n w i t h s e x u a l p u r i t y, i n n o c e n c e a n d m o d e s t y s t a n d s l a r g e l y
unchallenged, as does the double standard of sexual morality. Moreover, the
unfair division of labor in the family goes unremarked.

Women’s peace activism and nationalism
Peace activism is an arena in which some women in Sri Lanka have mobilized
to confront nationalism directly. Women For Peace, a movement for women
of all ethnic communities, formed in the late 1980s. In the fall of 1995,
Women For Peace promulgated a statement on nationalism and the war
between the Sinhala-dominated government and the secessionist L.T.T.E.
This document, entitled “Through the eyes of women: a new way of seeing
and knowing our reality,” deserves a close reading, both because of its wide
dissemination within Sri Lanka and because of what it reveals about the
complexities and difficulties of positioning women vis-à-vis nationalist
struggles.
The opening paragraphs of the document frame the war as something
v i s i t e d o n wo m e n ( “ u s ” ) w i t h o u t t h e i r k n ow l e d g e, a g r e e m e n t o r
participation:
Our country is being torn apart by war. The politicians, the television, and
newspapers tell us this is the way things are and the way things must be….
We did not start it, but we suffer, as daughters, sisters, wives, and mothers,
from the devastating consequences of war…. We are told that war is being
fought on behalf of the nation. The Tamil nation against the Sinhala nation.
But whose nation is this anyway?
(Women For Peace 1995–96:37)

The remainder of the document consists of a series of four paragraphs, each
one detailing some consequences of the war for a specific group of women.
Each parag raph ends with the refrain, “Shouldn’t we challeng e this
denigration of women’s lives?” For “Sinhala mothers,” the first group of
women mentioned, the denigration is sending sons to the battlefield. For
“Mothers of the North” (i.e. Tamil women living in the battle zones of the
northern province), the document points to the forcible conscription of
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their sons and daughters by the L.T.T.E., and life in a “militarised, socially
repressive environment.” For “Tamil women in Colombo,” the document
points to the vulnerability of their husbands and sons to abduction and
tor ture at the hands of state security personnel; it also points to the
vulnerability of these women themselves to ethnic prejudice and state
terrorism. For “Muslim women of the East” (i.e. those living in the eastern
province of Sri Lanka, another zone of armed conflict), the document
enumerates impoverishment, restriction of movement, the disintegration of
community life and the ongoing risk of rape and violent abuse by men
fighting on one or the other side of the conflict.
“Through the eyes of women” offers important counterpoints to the
insistent pro-war rhetoric of Sinhala nationalist groups. The document
asserts that there is such a thing as a women’s perspective on questions of
national identity and on nationalist-inspired violence, one that involves
seeing and understanding differently than men; this feminine perspective
necessarily is both anti-war and anti-nationalist. Moreover, the Women For
Peace refuse the metaphor of woman as nation, waiting to be protected by
her sons and avenged in war. As the document asserts, women are victimized
by this “spurious justification” for “endless, meaningless war.” Furthermore,
the document embodies a call to women to set aside national interests in
favor of female solidarity and women-centered interests.
The courage of the Women For Peace should not be minimized. Yet a
closer reading of the document reveals that although it challenges some
elements of nationalist discourses about women, it accepts others without
question. For example, the document embraces and reiterates the premises
that nationalism is a masculinist ideology and that “aggressive militancy and
revolutionar y violence” are solely the province of “male nationalists.”
Indeed, the text is explicitly built upon familiar binary oppositions of men
and women, agents and victims, aggressors and pacifists. The text figures
women exclusively as non-combatants, victims and horrified witnesses to
the devastation of war. Even the women soldiers of the L.T.T.E. are recast
as “children” “snatched away from their mothers’ domestic embrace” and
“forced” to take part in suicide missions. Rhetorically appealing as such
portrayals may be, they constitute a rewriting of history. In all ethnic groups
in Sri Lanka, some women have embraced nationalist causes and some have
been active combatants. Perhaps the most publicized examples are the
numerous female cadres of the L.T.T.E. who have functioned as assassins
and suicide bombers. (Two of the most visible are the female suicide
bombers who assassinated Rajiv Gandhi in India and President Ranasinghe
Premadasa in Sri Lanka.) Sinhala women serve in the government armed
forces, albeit not in combat roles. Indeed, as the war has dragged on, the
participation of Sinhala women in the government armed forces and in
ancillary occupation has expanded greatly. For instance, in the fall of 1997,
women were recruited as police constables so that more male constables
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could be posted in dangerous border zones. In that same time period, the Sri Lanka
Air Force set out to recruit and train women to pilot surveillance and transport
aircraft. Moreover, as Daniel (1996) documents, Sinhala and Muslim women have
functioned as interrogators in the prison camps of the Sinhala-dominated
government; in that role, they have not stepped back from using torture on prisoners.
In village massacres in border territories, women and children of all ethnic groups
have participated in the carnage alongside men (Pieris and Marecek 1991). Less
dramatic but not to be disregarded are the legions of women who support the
nationalist projects of their ethnic communities. In summary, in their text, Women
For Peace attempt to dissociate women from nationalist ambitions and projects. But
this is a fiction that gives way to the reality of women’s complicity and active
engagement in those projects. Women in Sri Lanka have not stood apart from
nationalist projects but have been deeply implicated in them.
“Through the eyes of women” strives to create a unified category of “women,”
in order to promote a woman-centered antiwar politics. Thus, the opening lines of
the document assert the common suffering of women qua women: “we suffer as
daughters, sisters, wives, and mothers.” But this assertion is problematized by the
subsequent enumeration of the experiences of women from different ethnic groups.
Although this enumeration underscores the extent to which women suffered, it
inevitably points out that women have not all suffered equally. Singling out the specific
ways in which women from different ethnic groups experience ethnic violence invites
invidious distinctions among them. Moreover, not all suffering can be attributed to
generic “men”; each ethnic group has suffered because of the acts of members (men
and women) of other groups. Indeed, the suffering of some women (e.g. the
conscription of their children) is instrumental to the suffering of other women. Thus,
dichotomies such as women versus men, victims versus agents, domination versus
freedom, and perhaps even peace versus war are too simplistic. Instead of exposing
the complexities, ambiguities, and crosscurrents in the historical record of ethnic
relations in Sri Lanka, such dichotomies blanket them over. We must question whether
initiatives for conflict resolution framed in such dichotomies can work.
“Through the eyes of women” reveals just how difficult it is to move beyond the
gender dualisms that are embedded in discourses of Sinhala identity. Yet peace
activists must interrupt these dualisms. One reason, as I have noted, is the importance
of acknowledging that, in all ethnic groups, many women in Sri Lanka are not for
peace; indeed, some have taken active roles in injuring others. Another reason is that
claiming an essentialized female identity as peacemakers positions men as war-makers.
As “Through the eyes of women” puts it, “If men are for war, can’t we women be
for peace?” But not all men are for war. Yet if war is insistently linked with masculinity,
those men who are for peace are effectively marginalized.
Shortcomings aside, “Through the eyes of women” succeeds in claiming the
right of women from all ethnic communities in Sri Lanka to insert their voices
into ongoing public debates on ethnic relations, nationhood and war. Moreover,
it forcefully asserts that women’s experiences and perspectives are not necessarily
congruent with those of men; it demands that those experiences and perspectives
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be publicly registered. The document poses two powerful questions in succession:
“But whose nation is this anyway?” and “Shouldn’t we challenge this denigration
of women’s lives?” It challenges the exclusion of women from full and equal
participation in the nation, linking that exclusion to material practices that
jeopardize women’s physical safety and security, dignity, and autonomy.
Summary and conclusion
At the turn of the century, nationalist movements in Ceylon focused on
opposition to colonial rule and the right to sovereign nationhood. Instead of
embracing all ethnic groups, however, those movements coalesced around a single
ethnic group, the Sinhala people, and around Buddhism. In producing a Sinhala
Buddhist identity, a cultural heritage harking back to a glorious and ancient
civilization was constructed. This construction served both to establish the
difference and separateness of the Sinhala from other groups, and to justify their
political and cultural hegemony. This heritage included an elaborate gender
ideology, which specified the attributes of righteous womanhood and the
relations of power between women and men. As I have indicated, the ideologies
of womanhood that prevail in present-day Sri Lanka bear the direct imprint of
this gender ideology. Thus, women who conform to the ideals of traditional
womanhood are extolled as custodians of the cultural heritage; women who step
outside them come under attack. The strength of the link between traditional
ideals of womanhood and national identity is apparent in the media attacks on
feminists who have challenged traditional gender ideologies. They are labeled as
inauthentic, alienated from their own culture, and deracinated. Their ideas are
discredited as borrowings from the “outside” (specifically from the “degenerate”
West), not as bona fide expressions of dissent from within.
At the anniversary of the first fifty years of Independence, Sri Lanka faces
the formidable task of crafting a state in which the needs and interests of
different ethnic groups are protected and respected. That task is made all the
harder because the post-Independence record thus far has been marred by crude
majoritarianism, mistrust among ethnic groups, violence and a protracted civil
war. Thus far, women too have not been included fully as equal and respected
participants in political life. As we have seen, the gender ideologies arising from
Sinhala nationalism have functioned to keep women in a silenced and subordinate
status. To be respectable, women must remain in the confines of the domestic
sphere, under the protective authority of men and without a public voice. To do
otherwise risks moral and sexual degradation. People do not, as Rosa Luxemburg
(1976) observed, “homogeneously inhabit any given piece of territory.” Women’s
interests and needs are not always congruent with men’s, even when they have
a common ethnic identity. In order for those needs to be recognized and
respected, women must be included in the nation not as symbols, but as
speaking subjects.
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Notes
1

The quotation is a line from a poem composed by a Buddhist nun in the first century B.C., collected
and translated by Caroline Rhys-Davids (1909:45–46). The stanza reads:
How should a woman’s nature hinder us?
When hearts are firmly set, who ever moves
With growing knowledge onward in the path?…
Am I a woman in these matters, or
Am I a man, or what am I then?

2

3

4

5

For example, individuals might identify themselves as Jaffna Tamils, Batticaloa Tamils, Colombo
Tamils or Hill Country Tamils. The last group have also been called Estate Tamils because they
or their ancestors worked on tea estates and Indian Tamils because their ancestors migrated from
India to labor on British-operated estates.
Masculinities and male sexuality have been subjects of much fruitful theorizing about the British
Empire and Indian anti-imperialism. Given the cultural and historical parallels between India and
Sri Lanka, there is good reason to believe that they will be significant in the Sri Lankan case.
Many Tamils and Muslims live in areas that are battlegrounds in the ongoing civil war between the
L.T.T.E., a militant Tamil nationalist group, and the state; they live in conditions of extreme hardship
and terror. On Tamil national identity, the reader is referred to Balasingham (1993), Cheran (1992),
Coomaraswamy (1987), Daniel (1996), Hoole et al. (1990), Lawrence (1997), Maunaguru (1995)
and Pfaffenberger and Chelvadurai (1994). On Muslim identity, see Ismail (1995).
Tamil women wear saris but also mark their foreheads with a pottu, a small red circle.
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